In his original paper Kuska set forth four Propositions indicting a large number of balance-of-payments models (which he chose to call "Keynesian")
as being "inadequate" or inconsistent.
His Proposition 1 stated that omission of wealth in asset demand functions can have potentially bizarre implications for the implicit specification of "suppressed" asset demand functions. Along with our fellow commentators we agreed with this proposition, pointing out that it is well-known and has been reflected in macroeconomic models for some time without affecting their essential features or implications for policy in a fundamental way. No more need be said about this.
Kuska's Propositions 2 and 3 are the source of the controversy. Proposition 2 states that "Models which bring each country's demand and supply of money into equality have zero overall balance-of-payments figures in all periods. This is true whether the supplies of money are taken to be endogenous or exogenous.
If in addition, the model includes other equations which allow the overall balanceof-payments to be non-zero, it is contradictory" (p.664).
In Proposition 3 he states that "Models in which more than one market-clearing equation is suppressed do not require equilibrium in any of the excluded markets" (p.664).1
Our cormient demonstrated that Proposition 2 is based on an erroneous concept of equilibrium in which beginnning-of-period asset supplies are equated to end-of-period demands.
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Proposition 4 is a corollary of Proposition 2.
-2-Proposition 3 we showed was false for the case in which bonds are internationally immobile (the one Kuska considered) but true if they are mobile between countries.
We also pointed out that an implication of a proper specification is that, when bonds are internationally mobile, only one country can control or independently target its money supply.
In his reply Kuska attempts to resurrect his Proposition 2 and 3, arguing that they fail to obtain only when "simultaneous sterilisation" (which he asserts is an "empirically false assumption") takes place. In addition, concerning the endogeneity of one national money supply in a two-country fixed exchange rate world, he claims that "Buiter and Eaton made a slip in their analysis, for it transpires that both money market equations are redundant in the general model' (p.888).
I.
On confusing changes in the money supply with domestic credit expansion
In fact, Kuska's two propositions are false regardless of whether or not the monetary authorities sterilise payments imbalances, as is his assertion that in a two-country framework with traded bonds both national money supplies are exogenous. His results follow from an error that is at the same time elementary and fundamental: he simply confuses the change in the domestic money stock with domestic credit expansion. As can be found in any text on the money supply process, in an "outside" money economy, the change in the (high-powered) money supply equals net central bank purchases of domestic government bonds (domestic money expansion) plus the domestic currency value of the change in international reserve holdings.1
Kuska introduces his error in his reply immediately following his equations (15) and (16) repeated here: Equation (4) equates AM*e to AR*.
The change in total money supplies, * which we will call AM and AM S are, of course, the sums of domestic credit expansion and the change in reserves; i.e. By themselves, Kuska's equations (15) and (16) (our (1) ahd (2)) are almost correct. Replacing M by M5 and M* by M*s would make them wholly correct.
We therefore replace (1) and (2) by
What is wrong Ts his interpretation of them, that "the balance of payments of the government and private sectors is equal-to their excess demand for money" (p.891, emphasis added). The right-hand sides of his equations (15) and (16) We follow Kuska in assuming that money is only held by private residents in its country of issue. In our comment we also permitted domestic money to be held by foreign authorities (and vice versa).
The loss of reserves for the domestic country was identified with the acquisition of domestic money by the foreign authorities net of the acquisition of foreign money by the domestic authorities (and conversely for the change in foreign reserves). In Kuska's exposition (followed here) reserves are best thought of as an "outside" asset such as gold.
No substantial conclusions are affected by this minor change in specification. (19) and (20), repeated here, again with M and M* replaced by M5 and M5 respectively.
The riaht-hand sides of Kuska's corrected equations (15) and (16) (15) and (16) (our (1') and (2')) did in fact represent the excess demands for money then, of course, his Proposition 2 would follow.
Since the correct definitions are provided by the negative of the left-hand sides of his amended equations (19) and (20) (our (5) and (6)), equilibrium is perfectly compatible with
What Kuska has failed to realise is that under a regime of fixed exchange rates it is precisely the balance-of payments that equilibrates the money markets.
If end-of-period money demand exceeds the initial money stock by more than domestic credit expansion in that period, then a balance-of-payments surplus in that period provides the additional supply necessary to equilibrate end-ofperiod supply and demand. Conversely if domestic credit expansion exceeds the excess of end-of-period money demand over the beginning-of-period money 1
In this sense Kuska's reply represents a step forward from his first publication.
Instead of equating end-of-period demand to beginning-ofperiod supply he now adds to the beginning-of-period supply the within-period change from one source, domestic credit expansion.
The within-period change arisirfrom the change in in reserve holdings has not yet gained recognition in Kuska's equilibrium conditions. stock, a balance-of-payments deficit ensues.1 This point has been made succinctly by Johnson (1971) .
'Assume a country on a fixed exchange rate system, that the public adjusts its money holdings to the desired level (always and instantaneously) through spending or not spending, that there is a high degree of substitutability between the goods of this country and those of the rest of the world, that the world price level is constant, and money demanded is a multiple of income (Md = KY).
Then the money supply existing at any time will be the sum of the assets backing the domestic money supply (international reserves and domestic credits
The basic assumption is that the money supply must always equal money demanded (Ms = Md). Note that sterilisation (let alone exact, simultaneous sterilisation) is nowhere required.
The magnitude and duration of the balance-of-paymnts deficits that a country can run are of course constrained by the size of its stock of reserves.
I.B
The exogeneity of money supplies
The same confusion between changes in the money supply and domestic credit expansion lead Kuska to conclude that, in a two-country framework, both money supplies can be exogenous or independently determined. Here he incorrectly calls these magnitudes the changes in the money stocks, thereby "proving" that the money stocks are exogenous.
On page 895 he has apparently adopted the correct definition of the money stock, but nevertheless applies the * theorem that was proven for AM and AM , and asserts that the two money stocks, now defined correctly, are also exogenous, which of course they are not.
-7-He does establish Proposition 3 using a model in which bonds are traded.
As we pointed out in our comment, for this case his Proposition 3 would have been correct. He does not qualify his result, however, for the no mobility case.
In addition he introduces a misleading and spurious distinction between "Keynesian" and "r"lonetary-Approach" definitions of the balance-of-payments, confusing ex ante and ex post or equilibrium notions.
The sources of confusion can best be demonstrated by considering Kuska's full model, restated here in a slightly more compact form:
Kuska's equations (19) through (24) amended again by substituting MS for M * and M for M , repeated here as equations (9) 
Here A and 0 denote beginning-of-period supplies of domestic and foreign bonds * * respectively, held by private agents in the home country while A and D are the * amounts held by private agents abroad; H and H denote home and foreign demands * 2 for domestic bonds while 3 and 3 are the hone and foreign demands for foreign bonds. These are identical to the ones we presented in our equations (17) through (22) except that Kuska's equations (24) and (25) (repeated here as (11) and (12)) equate output to income while ours equated goods supplied to goods demanded. The two conditions are related by Wairas' Law so we have no quarrel with this change. Equations (7) through (12) are related by two aggregate national budget constraints, Kuska's equations (7) and (8) repeated here with the ususal amendments:
Finally, the home country's reserve gain must identically equal the foreign loss:
An important point is that equations (7) through (15) completely describe a general equilibrium system without any reference to the balance of payments.
A definition of the balance of payments in terms of magnitudes determined by this system can be appended, but it is not necessary for solving it. If formulated appropriately a balance-of-payments definition can be interpreted as an equilibrium condition to replace any one of equilibrium conditions (7) through (14).
II.A
The redundancy of one equilibrium condition : traded bonds Assume that (7) and (11) and (8) and (12) obtain.
Then (13) becomes:
While (14) becomes:
They are derived by combining the government and private sector constraints for each country, given by equations (9) and (12) and (10) and (14) of our comment. Equations (18) and (15) Requiring that one bond market be in equilibrium as well as both money markets and both goods markets does, however, insure equilibrium in all markets. One and only one bond market can be suppressed. Any five of conditions (7) through (12) (16) and (17) reduce to
X-eX a D -D* -AD) +AMe (20) With no trade in bonds and no external debt service payments, the conditions
hold identically. Therefore (19) and (21) imply domestic bond market equilibrium while (20) and (22) This is false. In our comment, as above, we make no use of the balance-ofpayments equation as an equilibrium condition to determine equilibrium. The balance-of-payments can be inferred from equilibrium in the money, bonds and goods markets and the budget constraints. Wairas' Law does, however, permit replacing one equilibrium condition with a linear combination of that condition and others. Thus replacing one bond market equilibrium condition with a condition that equates the change in reserves to an expression for the balanceof-payments that is derived using that bond market equilibrium condition is a valid procedure.
Kuska provides two sets of definitions of the balance-of-payments. The first set, which he calls the "monetary-approach" definitions, is given in his equations (11) and (12), repeated here:
The second set, which he calls the "Keynesian" definitions, are given in his equations (13) and (14) repeated here:
B -e*X + A*/e -DJ + PD (J -D) -ePA (H* -A*)
* * Substituting B and B from (23) and (24) for R and R in the budget constraints (7) and (8) equations (27) and (28) 
It is not correct, as Kuska asserts, that "Even in this situation
where not all markets clear in an equilibrium sense, the budget constraints and the monetary-approach definitions, and therefore equations (15) and (16), (our equations (1') and (2')) must hold for any actual trading which takes place" (p.895, footnote 10, emphasis in the original).
Since Kuska's "monetary-approach" definitions of the balance-of-payments are equivalent to money market equilibrium conditions, they cannot be substituted as equilibrium conditions for either the bond market or goods market equilibrium conditions. On the other hand, combining what Kuska calls the "Keynesian" definitions, (25) and (26), with the budget constraints (7) and (8), yields
These are linear combinations of money, bond and goods market equilibrium conditions. The so-called "Keynesian" definitions of the balance-of-payments, then, can be substituted as equilibrium conditions for any one of the money, bonds or goods market equilibrium conditions. Thus suppressing two bond market eouilibrium conditions even when bonds are traded is a valid procedure if the appropriate balance-of-payments "equilibrium" condition such as our (25) and (26) is introduced. On the "flow" specification of capital movements
On page 893 Kuska shifts ground in his attack on "Keynesian" balance-ofpayments models, resurrecting the now very familiar issue of the "flow" specification of capital movements: "Indeed, the balance-of-payments definitions used in the literature are invariably different from those called Keynesian here, being generally written as variants of:
B" = X -eX* + eD -A* + F (r -r*) [(33)] B' = [x* -X/e + A*/e -Dj -e*F (r -r)' (p.893). [(34)] (Our equations (33) and (34) appear as equations (31) and (32) in Kuska).
Kuskas criticism of this specification is more justified than the rest of his attack. Comparing (33) and (34) with (25) and (26) shows that these
a rather unlikely functional form since beginning-of-period stocks do not affect the within-period movement of capital.
In criticising this specification Kuska takes a position held by most balance-of-payments economists, "Keynesian' or otherwise, for well over a decade.
Since the criticism by William H. Branson (1970) , specification of international capital movements in terms of asset market equilibrium has become standard.
(See also, Branson (l976a, l976b) , Turriovsky (1976) , Dornbusch (1977) , 1 Kuska's confusion on this point relates to the general issue of the applicability of Walras' Law ex ante in equilibrium and ex post. Since a complete discussion would take us somewhat far afield the interested reader is referred to Buiter (1980) . Allen and Kenen (1980) and Whitman (1970) ).
The only models that we know of from the past decade that employ (33) and (34) are those by Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982) and Dornbusch and Frenkel (1982) . If criticising the "Keynesian" models for using a flow specification of capital movements is to become the major thrust of Kuska's attack, he is only just joining the rest of the profession.
IV.
Conclusion
Kuska's first paper and his reply both fall into the unhappy category of "What's right is not new and what's new is not right". Right but not new are
(1) the recognition that wealth should, in general, be an argument in asset demand functions; (2) the proposition that, in general (but not in the model without capital mobility analysed in Kuska (1978) ), 4alras' Law permits the suppression of only one equilibrium condition; and (3) the familiar criticism of the "flow" specification of capital movements. New but not right are the following: (1) the proposition that (in a two-country, fixed exchange rate world) equilibrium between money demand and money supply in both countries implies balance-of-payments equilibrium. Kuskas Proposition 2 is false regardless of whether "the monetary authorities are able to sterilise exactly and simultaneousli all balance-of-payments flows" (Kuska (1982, p.887 ) italics in the original).
(2) The proposition that in a two-country world with a fixed exchange rate, given public spending, taxation, and borrowing, both countries' authorities can choose their money supplies independently.
It is important to note that this whole unfortunate debate concerns matters of logic, not of doctrine. does not equal the difference between end-of-period money demand and the initial money stock,1 it is the change in reserves created by a non-zero payments balance that creates the change in the money stock required to maintain money market equilibrium. This is the fundamental insight of the monetary approach to the balance of payments.
If there is monetary equilibrium in successive periods, this equals the change in money demand.
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